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Friday, July 6, 2012

Revealing Facts About Sherif Hussein's Sons' Involvement Against Establishing Israel

Nadene Goldfoot
Sherif Hussein was the father of Abdullah, and Sherif had supported Zionism.  He must not have figured that this would lead to a completely independent Jewish state, though.  However, Abdullah's elder brother Emir Faisal had promised Chaim Weizmann his support in 1918 at the end of World War I. when Weizmann had visited him in his desert camp.  He had told him he would support the Balfour Declaration but did not mention conditions.  He thought Jews were very influential in the world and would help him achieve his coveted goal:  World sanction for an independent Greater Syria which he would head.  

Faisal didn't consider the Balfour Declaration to be the British rejection of earlier promises to the Arabs to support the establishment of an independent Arab world in the Middle East when the Ottoman Empire was gone.  After all, they had supported the British with an Arab military uprising against the Turks.  The promises to the Arabs were in vague terms by the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry MacMahon, in correspondence with Hussein.

Sherif Hussein was the ruler of the Hedjaz area that later became known as Saudi Arabia.  He had assured D.G. Hogarth, a British representative in 1918 that he would support the Balfour Declaration---if it did not mean the establishment of an independent Jewish state. He lost the chance to be king of Arabia to Ibn Saud.

Saudi Arabia had never been as opposed to Zionism as most other Arab states.  Harry St. John Philby, a British adviser to the first king of Saudi Arabia, a Bedouin,  King  Abdulaziz b: 1876-d: 9 November 1953, otherwise known as Ibn Saud, wrote that he suggested to Weizmann a plan where all Palestine would go to the Jews, who would give Saud 20 million pounds to resettle the Palestine Arabs.

Weizmann, in referring to this plan, said that Winston Churchill favored such a solution, under which Saud would become "Lord of the Middle East.'  According to Philby, Saud waited for Churchill and Roosevelt to make the first move, but they didn't.  Then, Saud showed an uncompromising attitude towards the Jews in conversations with Roosevelt following the Yalta conference while on a cruiser on February 4-11, 1945. He had grown afraid of the other Arabs' reactions.    Roosevelt decided then to take no action which might prove hostile to the Arab people.  When  Truman came into office, this was thrown up to him as a reminder.  He rejected it, and did vote for Israel's statehood.  

Abdullah was in his Amman Shuneh Palace on December 17, 1947 reading a report about the partition plan to divide the 20% that was left of the Jewish Homeland between the Arabs and the Jews.  The Mufti of Jerusalem's plans were to arm his supporters to be ready when the British troops left on May 14, 1948.  They had collected 10,000 rifles and other light arms to give to the Palestine Arabs and were recruiting about 3,000 volunteers ready to be trained and organized.  Abdullah  was against this and wanted the intervention of the regular Arab armies to enter as the Arab Legions was the only modern well-trained regular Arab force.  With them, he could occupy the area allocated by the UN to the Arabs in accordance with his secret proposal to the Jews.

The Muft of Jerusalem, Syrians and Egyptians feared the Arab Legion would then occupy Arab Palestine.  Saudi Arabia was against arming the Palestinians and also bringing in the regular armies.  Iraq's rulers, Hashemites like Abdullah, would not cooperate with Transjordan.  They were trying to get a defense agreement with Britain and wanted to counter protests at home that the government was soft on imperialism and Zionism.  The premiers decided to implement the secret decisions of the Bludan Conference.

June 1946 in Bludan, Syria, the Arab States had up to now paid only lip service to anti-Zionism.  They were too busy in their own problems to move against the Jews of Palestine.  The Anglo-American Commission recommended that 100,000 Jewish refugees be allowed to enter Palestine immediately.  This need was that the Holocaust was over and survivors had no place to go.  They were being placed in detention camps in Cyprus, for one.

These leaders  were eager to see a conflict between Truman of the USA and and the British who were against it.  The British needed "evidence" to show that immigration would lead to bloodshed, so the Arabs called a conference of the Arab League Political Committee in Bludan.  They rejected the American idea of allowing immigration and secretly decided that if the Palestine Arabs went to war, the Arab States would not be able to stop their people from coming to their aid with money, arms and volunteers.

The British were busy instigating Arab rebellion and the British Representatives in Amman asked Abdulla if he would permit volunteers to cross into Palestine from Transjordan.  He was against the crossing himself but agreed.  He could be accused of selling out to the British and Jews.  Bevin himself approved of this idea.  They agreed to have the volunteers pass secretly after midnight so others would think they had infiltrated into Palestine without official Transjordan or British knowledge.  They would move in a group with Arab Legion guards marching to the front and rear until they crossed into Palestine.  They wouldn't stay in Jerusalem, but march to the Nablus area in central Palestine.  It all ended up that Britain would continue to supply arms to Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan.  On January 21, 20 trucks with Syrian license plates carrying over 700 Arab Liberation Army men under Safr Bek, a Syrian officer, raced across the border into Palestine to fight.  However, the British-Iraqi arms agreement was cancelled shortly after it had been drawn up when mobs rioted in Baghdad in protest against British "imperialism."

Resource:  Genesis 1948 by Dan Kurzman

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